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STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Lois M. Borden, Appellant-Personal Representative in 
the above-referenced matter, presents on appeal the following 
issue: 
Are the children of the decedent, Dean Charles 
Burnham, pretermitted heirs under Section 75-2-302 of the Utah 
Uniform Probate Code, and thus entitled to an intestate share 
of decedent's estate, irrespective of the express terms of 
decedent's Last Will and Testament, which leaves his entire 
estate to his wife, Charlotte L. Burnham, and precludes any 
"beneficiary, legal heir, heirs of issue" from taking a share 
of the decedent's estate? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Section 75-2-302 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code 
relied upon by Appellant, Lois M. Borden, is attached herewith 
as Exhibit MAM. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the granting of a Motion for 
Summary Judgment for Respondents, Dean Charles Burnham, Jr. and 
Anna Marie Burnham, in the probate of the Last Will and Testa-
ment of Dean Charles Burnham. The motion by the Respondents 
that they are pretermitted heirs and are entitled to receive an 
intestate share of decedent's estate pursuant to Section 
75-2-302 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code was granted and 
entered by the Honorable Judge Philip R. Fishier of the Third 
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 28, 1984, Dean Charles Burnham executed a Last 
Will and Testament (hereinafter referred to as the MWillM). At 
the time of the execution of the Will, the decedent was ill 
with cancer, and in fact, died on August 1, 1984. The decedent 
married Charlotte L. Burnham on July 22, 1983, after having 
known and lived with her for over ten years. At the time of 
said marriage, decedent had children from a previous marriage, 
two of whom, Dean Charles Burnham, Jr. and Anna Marie Burnham, 
(hereinafter referred to as the "Claimants") challenged the 
Will on the basis that they were pretermitted heirs under 
Section 75-2-302 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code. The 
relevant provisions of the decedent's Will provide, in 
pertinent part: 
FOURTH: I GIVE, BEQUEATH AND DEVISE ALL OF 
MY PROPERTY, REAL AND PERSONAL, OF EVERY 
KIND AND NATURE WHATSOEVER, AND WHERESOEVER 
SITUATE TO MY WIFE, CHARLOTTE LANE. 
FIFTH: IN THE EVENT any beneficiary, legal 
heir, heirs of issue may claim under this 
Will, singly, or in connection with any 
other person or persons, or shall contest in 
any Court the validity of this Will, or 
shall seek to obtain an adjudication of any 
proceedings in any Court that any provision 
of my Last Will and Testament is void, or 
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shall seek otherwise to void, nullify, or 
set aside any of its provisions, then and in 
that event, the right of said person or 
persons shall be determined as if that 
person or persons had predeceased me, and 
the execution of all provisions of this 
declaration of my last Will and Testament 
without surviving issue. My executrix is 
directed to defend at the expense of my 
estate any contest or other attack of any 
nature whatsoever on this, my last Will and 
Testament or any of the provisions thereof. 
A copy of the Will is attached herewith as Exhibit "B". 
Approximately four months after decedent's death, the 
Personal Representative filed a petition for a formal probate 
of decedent's Will and for her formal appointment as Personal 
Representative of the estate. On or about December 13, 1984, 
the Claimants challenged the probate of decedent's Will on the 
basis that the Will was not valid. On or about February 1, 
1985, the Claimants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking 
both to invalidate the Will and a determination that the 
Claimants were pretermitted heirs. Shortly thereafter, the 
Personal Representative filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
seeking both to validate decedent's Will and a determination 
that the Claimants were not pretermitted heirs under Section 
75-2-302(1)(a) of the Utah Uniform Probate Code. 
In his Memorandum Decision of March 21, 1985, the 
Honorable Judge Philip R. Fishier found the Claimants to be 
pretermitted heirs and granted, in part, their Motion for 
Summary Judgment. In a subsequent Order on Memorandum 
Decision, Admitting Will to Probate, and Appointing Personal 
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Representative, (hereinafter referred to as the "Final Order-) 
dated May 31, 1985, Judge Fishier ordered, among other things, 
that the Claimants receive an intestate share of the decedent's 
estate as pretermitted heirs pursuant to the aforesaid Memoran-
dum Decision. On or about July 28, 1985, the Personal 
Representative filed a Notice of Appeal within thirty days from 
the aforesaid Final Order pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Section 75-2-302(1)(2) of the Utah Uniform Probate 
Code provides that if a testator fails to provide for his 
children in his will, the omitted children receive a share of 
the testator's estate equal to what the children would have 
received had the testator died intestate, unless, among other 
things, it appears from the will that the omission was inten-
tional. The provisions under the decedent's Will clearly 
demonstrate that the decedent intentionally omitted his 
children, including the Claimants, from taking a share of the 
his estate. The decedent left his entire estate to his wife, 
Charlotte L. Burnham, pursuant to paragraph FOURTH, and then 
provided in paragraph FIFTH that if any "beneficiary, legal 
heir, heirs of issue" made any claim under decedent's Will, 
then such person would be deemed to have predeceased the 
decedent without surviving issue, and thus take nothing. Thus, 
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decedent's complete disposition of his estate to his wife, 
together with language that precludes his children as heirs 
from taking a share of his estate, evinces a definite intent 
that decedent intentionally omitted his children from the 
provisions of his Will. Moreover, the in-terrorem clause under 
paragraph FIFTH of decedent's Will which, in part, precludes 
any heirs as a class from taking under the Will is, in effect, 
both an in-terrorem and a disinheritance provision. Therefore, 
the provisions of the decedent's Will clearly satisfy the 
requirements under Section 75-5-302(1)(a) of the Utah Uniform 
Probate Code, and effectively preclude the Claimants as heirs 




THE CLAIMANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED 
TO INHERIT AS PRETERMITTED HEIRS 
A. Complete Disposition of Decedent's Estate, Together with 
Language Disinheriting Will Contestants, Clearly Demon-
strates Decedent's Intent to Disinherit the Claimants. 
The pretermitted heir statute under section 75-2-302, 
Utah Uniform Probate Code, provides, in pertinent part: 
(1) If a testator fails to provide in his 
will for any of his children or issue of a 
deceased child, the omitted child or issue 
receives its share in the estate equal in 
value to that which he would have received 
if the testator had died intestate unless: 
(a) It appears from the will that the 
omission was intentional; . . . 
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The Utah Supreme Court has not decided any cases 
concerning the above section of the Utah Uniform Probate Code, 
which was adopted effective July 1, 1977. However, the 
decision of In re Newell's Estate, 78 Utah 463, 5 P.2d 230 
(1970), decided under the former pretermitted heir statute 
which, essentially identical to Section 75-2-302(1)(a) of the 
Utah Uniform Probate Code, provided that omitted children and 
issue of deceased children would take an intestate share in the 
estate unless their omission from the will was intentional, may 
be of significance in the instant matter. In Newell's Estate, 
the decedent's grandchild challenged the distribution of dece-
dent's estate on the basis that the will failed to mention 
descendants of a deceased child of the decedent. The will 
provided for the distribution of the entire estate to certain 
named individuals and charitable institutions. After reviewing 
all the facts and circumstances in the matter, the Utah Supreme 
Court noted: 
Under the statute it thus is clear that such 
omitted heir does not share in the estate of 
a testator when it appears, either by the 
will or by evidence dehors the will, or by 
both, that the omission was intentional. 
Language of a will and bequests and devises 
may be of such character as to lead to but 
one conclusion, that all others except those 
mentioned in the will were intended to be 
excluded. Such is well illustrated by the 
cited case of Hawhe v. Chicago &W.I.R. Co., 
[165 111. 561, 46 N.E. 240] where no mention 
was made of any of the children of the 
testator, and where he devised and 
bequeathed all his estate, real, personal 
and mixed and of every kind, whatsoever, to 
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his wife . . . In such case, and as the 
Illinois court held, language could not have 
been used which would more clearly express 
an intention that the wife and she alone was 
to take and hold the testator's estate tfi 
the exclusion of all others including his 
children, [Emphasis supplied.] 
In re Newell's Estate, 78 Utah at 481, 5 P.2d at 237. Thus, 
under Utah law, complete disposition of a decedent's estate to 
designated beneficiaries effectively demonstrates sufficient 
intent on the part of the decedent to exclude his children or 
issue of deceased children from taking under a will. 
Similarly, in In the Matter of the Estate of Hester, 
671 P.2d 54 (Okla. 1983), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that 
a false statement that the decedent had no children, coupled 
with a complete disposition of the decedent's estate 
constituted sufficient intent to disinherit the decedent's 
son. In that case, decedent's son, who claimed to be a 
pretermitted heir of the decedent, appealed from a lower court 
decision upholding the decedent's will. Concluding that the 
^However, under case law in other jurisdictions, language 
of a will leaving everything to the decedent's spouse may not, 
in and of itself, be sufficient to exclude the children. The 
Oklahoma Supreme Court, in In the Matter of the Estate of 
Crump, 614 P.2d 1096 (Okla. 1980), held that: 
Testorial disposition of the entire estate 
does not alone affirmatively evince an 
intent to omit to provide for a child or a 
deceased child's issue. 
Matter of the Estate of Crump, 614 P.2d at 1099. 
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decedent intentionally excluded his children from taking under 
the will, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that: 
[A] specific denial of the existence of 
members of a class to which the claimant 
belongs, coupled with a complete disposition 
of the estate by will, evinces a definite 
intent that all members of the named class 
are intentionally omitted from the provi-
sions of the testator's will. 
Matter of the Estate of Hester, 671 P.2d at 55. 
Applying the rationales of Newell and Hester to the 
instant matter, decedent's Will clearly demonstrates that the 
decedent intentionally omitted his children. The decedent left 
his entire estate to his wife, Charlotte L. Burnham, pursuant 
to paragraph FOURTH, and then provided in paragraph FIFTH that 
if any "beneficiary, legal heir, heirs of issue" made any claim 
against his estate, then such person would take nothing. 
Accordingly, the disinheritance provision in paragraph FIFTH, 
together with the complete disposition of the decedent's estate 
by his Will to his wife, evinces a definite intent that the 
decedent intentionally omitted his children, including the 
Claimants, from taking under the provisions of his Will. 
B. An In-Terrorem Clause Precluding "Heirs" as a Class from 
Taking Under a Will Constitutes An Effective Disinheritance 
Provision. 
It is well-established that in-terrorem clauses 
precluding heirs as a class from taking under a will are 
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sufficient to preclude operation of the pretermitted heir 
statute. In In the Matter of the Estate of Hilton, 649 P.2d 
488 (N.M. 1982), a decedent pursuant to his Last Will and 
Testament left all of his real property to his wife, and upon 
her death, to his three daughters. The decedent's will made no 
mention of a deceased son or of the son's two surviving 
children. The will provided that the decedent had only three 
children and "that if any other person claims to be a child or 
heir of mine and establishes such a claim in a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction, I give to such person the sum of One 
Dollar." The children of the deceased son challenged the will 
as pretermitted heirs under the New Mexico statute which, like 
Utah's statute, requires that the intention of the decedent to 
disinherit heirs appear from the language of the will itself. 
In holding that the provisions of the in-terrorem clause 
satisfied the requirements of the New Mexico pretermitted heir 
statute, the New Mexico Supreme Court, in a case of first 
impression, concluded: 
[T]he language contained in paragraph VII 
[an in-terrorem clause] of testator's will 
stating that if any person claims to be an 
'heir of mine and establishes such a claim 
in a court of competent jurisdiction* 
amounts to an expression by the testator of 
an intention to exclude appellants as heirs 
from taking under his will as a class. 
As noted in 45 Cal. L. Rev. 220 
(1957): The ordinary no-contest 
clause, disinheriting or leaving a 
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nominal sum to 'any other person or 
persons' or 'anyone who may contest 
this will,1 has been held insufficient 
to show the required intent to 
exclude. On the other hand, clauses 
excluding or making nominal provisions 
for 'heirs' or 'persons claiming to be 
heirs' have been held specific enough 
to prevent descendants from claiming 
under the pretermitted heir statute. 
[Emphasis supplied.] 
Matter of the Estate of Hilton, 649 P.2d at 495. The Hilton 
Court further relied upon an article which states, in pertinent 
part: 
The California Courts in interpreting this 
[pretermitted heir] statute . . . in the 
past have evolved certain rules and 
principles which they now seem to use as 
guides. For example, it appears that it is 
not essential that the claimant be named or 
identified specifically by the Will. The 
use by the testator of a word which 
describes a class of persons, such as 
'children' or 'relatives' is generally 
considered sufficient to exclude the 
application of the pretermitted heir 
statute. Also, the use of the word 'heirs' 
in a will to describe the class of persons 
who are not to participate in the testator's 
estate has been held sufficient to show the 
intention of the testator to exclude his 
children from participating in the estate. 
[Emphasis supplied.] 
Note, Wills: Rights of Pretermitted Heirs Under 
California Probate Code, Section 90, 8 Hastings L.J. 
342-343 (1957). 
Furthermore, in In the Matter of the Estate of 
McClure, 214 Cal. App. 2d 590, 29 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1963), a 
decision principally relied upon by the Hilton Court, the 
daughter of a predeceased son was not named in her 
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grandmother's will and the will specified that the testatrix 
left one dollar to anyone who contested the will and claimed to 
be an heir to the estate. Rejecting the granddaughter's claim 
as a pretermitted heir, the California appellate court 
concluded: 
[A] provision in a will bequeathing a nom-
inal amount to any person claiming to be an 
heir of the testator refers to a child of 
the testator not otherwise provided for 
therein, and satisfies the requirements of 
[the pretermitted heir statute] that it 
appear therefrom that he had such child in 
mind at the time of executing his will, and 
intentionally omitted making any other pro-
vision therefor. [Citations omitted.] Such 
a provision is equivalent to a disinheri-
tance clause. [Citations omitted.] 
[Emphasis supplied.] 
Matter of the Estate of McClure, 214, Cal. App. 2d at , 29 
Cal. Rptr. at 571. 
Under the rationales of both Hilton and McClure, para-
graph FIFTH of the decedent's Will in the instant matter 
clearly demonstrates that the decedent intentionally excluded 
the Claimants, as heirs, from taking under his Will. Paragraph 
FIFTH clearly pertains to the decedent's children, two of whom 
are the Claimants, inasmuch as the paragraph refers to any 
-legal heir" who claims under the Will. Moreover, the dece-
dent's intent to exclude the Claimants from taking under the 
Will is further substantiated by decedent's complete disposi-
tion of his estate to his wife in paragraph FOURTH of the 
Will. Thus, the in-terrorem clause under paragraph FIFTH 
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constitutes, in effect, both an in-terrorem and a disinheri-
tance provision. 
Finally, In the Estate of Leonetti, 115 Cal. App. 3d 
at 378, 171 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1981), an executor of the 
decedents' estate appealed from a judgment determining that 
decedents' grandchildren were pretermitted heirs. The children 
of the predeceased daughter were not named in their grand-
parents' wills. Paragraph Thirteenth of both wills, entitled 
"Contest Provision" provided that "if any person or persons, 
whether an heir of mine or not, shall contest this Will, or any 
other provisions hereof, I give to such person or persons so 
contesting or objecting, the sum of One Dollar. . . . " The 
provision further disinherited any heirs seeking a claim 
against the wills. Concluding that the in-terrorem provision 
clearly established decedents' intention to disinherit all 
heirs not otherwise provided for in the wills, the California 
appellate court noted: 
No-contest clauses precluding heirs as a 
class from participating are in effect both 
no contest and disinheritance provisions. 
Such provisions are upheld against conten-
tions that they lack sufficient specificity 
to prevent the operation of the 
pretermission statute. (See Estate of 
Szekely (1980) 104 Cal. App. 3d 236, 163 
Cal. Rptr. 506k; Estate of Bank, supra, 248 
Cal. App. 2d 429, 433, 56 Cal. Rptr. 559; 
Estate of McClure, supra, 214 Cal. App. 2d 
590, 593, 29 Cal. Rptr. 569; Estate of 
Brown, (1958), 164 Cal. App. 2d 160, 161, 
330 P.2d 232.) [Emphasis supplied.] 
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In re Estate of Leonetti, 115 Cal. App. 3d at 383, 171 Cal. 
Rptr. at 306. See also, Van Strien v. Jones, 46 Cal. 2d 705, 
229 P.2d 1 (1956) (holding that the language -any person who if 
I died intestate would be entitled to share in my estate" is 
sufficient to disinherit a child or grandchild not otherwise 
provided for under a Will). 
In the instant matter, paragraph FIFTH of decedent's 
Will is clearly more than just an in-terrorem clause. This 
provision further provides that if any "beneficiary, legal 
heir, heirs of issue" make any claim under the Will, then such 
person will be deemed to have predeceased decedent without 
surviving issue, and thus take nothing. The language in para-
graph FIFTH of decedent's Will amounts to an expression by the 
decedent to exclude the Claimants as heirs from taking under 
the Will. Thus, the in-terrorem clause under paragraph FIFTH 
amounts, in effect, to both an in-terrorem and a disinheritance 
provision. Accordingly, paragraph FIFTH precludes the opera-
tion of Utah's pretermitted heir statute, and thus the 
Claimants are not pretermitted heirs under Section 75-2-302 
(l)(a) of the Utah Uniform Probate Code. 
Since the in-terrorem clause in paragraph FIFTH is 
also a disinheritance clause, the Personal Representative 
respectfully submits that the Third Judicial District Court 
decision, granting the Claimants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
that they are pretermitted heirs and are entitled to receive an 
-13-
intestate share of the decedent's estate, should be reversed. 
In the Memorandum Decision, dated March 21, 1985, Judge Philip 
R. Fishier concluded that paragraph FOURTH, which left the 
decedent's entire estate to his wife, did not effectively rebut 
the statutory presumption in favor of pretermitted heirs. 
(Memorandum Decision, p.4.) However, the Personal Representa-
tive never contended that paragraph FOURTH, in and of itself, 
amounted to a disinheritance provision. Rather, the Personal 
Representative contended that paragraph FOURTH, together with 
paragraph FIFTH, adequately rebutted any presumption that the 
Claimants were pretermitted heirs. Obviously, when the dece-
dent leaves his entire estate to his wife, and then further 
provides that any "legal heir" who makes any claim against his 
estate is to take nothing, clearly there is but one con-
clusion—that the decedent intentionally omitted to provide for 
his children, including the Claimants. 
Finally, the probate court, in its Memorandum Deci-
sion, concluded that paragraph FIFTH could not be construed to 
preclude the Claimants from taking an intestate share of dece-
dent's estate, since the Claimants, who challenged the Will as 
pretermitted heirs, were not contesting the Will but rather 
were seeking an intestate share in spite of the Will. (Memo-
randum or Decision, pp. 4-5.) Although the Claimants claim a 
share of decedent's estate in spite of the Will, the Personal 
Representative respectfully submits that paragraph FIFTH 
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clearly amounts to more than an in-terrorem provision. In 
addition to the standard in-terrorem language, this paragraph 
provides that any heir who claims an interest in the decedent's 
estate is to be determined to have predeceased the decedent 
without surviving issue, and thus take nothing. Thus, 
paragraph FIFTH amounts to a disinheritance provision, which 
when viewed together with paragraph FOURTH, effectively rebuts 
the presumption that the Claimants are pretermitted heirs. 
Accordingly, paragraph FIFTH of decedent's Will clearly 
satisfies the requirements of Section 75-2-302(1)(a) of the 
Utah Uniform Probate Code, and effectively precludes the 
Claimants from taking an intestate share of decedent's estate 
as pretermitted heirs. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Personal Representative 
respectfully submits that decedent's Will, in and of itself, 
clearly demonstrates that the decedent intentionally omitted to 
provide for his children, and thus precludes operation of 
Utah's pretermitted heir statute in favor of the Claimants. 
Accordingly, the Personal Representatives respectfully requests 
that this Court find that the Claimants are not pretermitted 
heirs under Utah law, and thus reverse the summary judgment in 
favor of the Claimants, entered by Judge Phillip R. Fishier of 
the Third Judicial District Court. 
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75-2-302. Pretermitted children—(1) If a 
testator fails to provide in his will for 
any of his children or issue of a deceased 
child, the omitted child or issue receives a 
share in the estate equal in value to that 
which he would have received if the testator 
had died intestate unless: 
(a) It appears from the will that the 
omission was intentional; 
(b) When the will was executed the 
testator had one or more children and 
devised substantially all his estate to 
or for the exclusive benefit of the 
other parent of the omitted child, or 
of the deceased child whose issue are 
omitted; or 
(c) The testator provided for the 
child or issue by transfer outside the 
will and the intent that the transfer 
be in lieu of a testamentary provision 
is shown by statements of the testator 
or from the amount of the transfer or 
other evidence. 
(2) If at the time of execution of the will 
the testator fails to provide in his will 
for a living child solely because he 
believes the child to be dead, the child 
receives a share in the estate equal in 
value to that which he would have received 
if the testator had died intestate. 
(3) In satisfying a share provided by this 
section, the devises made by the will abate 
as provided in section 75-3-902. 
(4) If the issue of a deceased child takes 
the share of the deceased child under 
section 75-2-605, the issue shall not be 
considered pretermitted and shall not 
receive a share of the estate under this 
section. 
(5) If it appears from the will that the 
omission of a child of the testator was 
intentional and if no express provision is 
made in the testator was intentional and if 
no express provision is made in the will for 
the issue of the child, the testator will be 
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IS 
Xfc i * 3 _ DEAN CHARLES BUPNHAM _ 
0/ Q&AMGIL comm— -. —v. 
! State of—-.-CAJ-IEQRNJA
 # fcr stij 0/ jew rirf one/ disposing mind and memory 1^ 
and not acting under dure::, menance, fraud, or the undue influence of any person u,homsor»ert 
do tnoke, publish, and declare this to be my last WILL AND TESTAMENT in manner • 
following, that is to say: 
\ } ' 2FirBltoI,fiJP^marrled to CHARLOTTE LANE. AND ALL. REFERENCES .INLUtiLS^VILL.. 
TO MY WIFE ARE TO HER ONLY, 
SECOVP: I direct that UPOT> mv demise , mv remains be crefl,B!CiL 
THIRP; I direct that my executrix hereinafter named pay ny lust deb:s and fu^erel 
expenses as soon after my de^se as r a y be practicable. 
ZDURmL.J-Cm, BEQUEATH AKHDEMISE-AI. I. OF MY PROPERTY, FTrl Xi2 
I PERSONAL, OF EVERY KIND AND NATURE WHATSOEVER, AND WHERESOEVER 
\ SITUATE TO MY WIFE , CHARLOTTE LANE. 
FIFTH- IN THE EVFNT any beneficiary, legal heir, heirs of issue - c > e c]c ~ 
I 
nnd£i-ihls.J)ttilL^£insiix^QL in conlunctiQa^wIlh^oy other person g sersgn • cr 
Shall contest in any Court the validity of this Will , or shall seek to cb»c!~ e-
adjud ic j tIon of any proceedings in any Court that any provision of tw is r v '?s ' 
WiiI,fljid.Ifi&tai!ifift ir. i-Qid-.ni.shall seek-Qih£imse-ifl .vold. rulhf/ ~ *?\ ~* ,ii 
any-ol-iljs jprovisions, :Le,n.aj3d.ia.y^I,ejiLeni^he.jjLchJLQf^%.Ld, 
shALLbe determined as if that person or pers_cns had jsredeceased ne , d~d tv e 
1
 .execution qf_all provisions of this de<~l_ajaUon_of ny]_ast Will and Tcstc^e^t 
without surviving Issue . My executrix- is directed todefend at the expense of 
1 
Will and Testament or any of the provisions there oJL 
: ..SIXTHS A T nominate arri appoint LOIS M BQP.nrv a.c r.ypr^!v n< - M * ~v 
1 
1
 Last Will and Testament, to serve without bond. 
B. If Lois M. Borden shall for a ny reasonfail toquallfy or cease to 
act as executrix. 1 then nominate CharIotte_L^rg_Burjtgri^lso to se^ve without 
SEVTr'Mf: J REVOKE A l l WILLS AND CODICILS. THAT I HAVE PREVIOUSLY VASE... 

iL.~ P A M J , < , ,~>*~j - ~* **'*«* uyyutnr- f:.A /J 4JL 
of tliis^ny last will and testament, and direct that no bond be required 
for the faithful performance of 
and hereby revoke all former wills by me made. 
3tl H&ilnPBH U H j m n f / have hereunto set my hand this—4Jt&L 
day of JUIX one thousand nine hundred and— EIGHTV-FOTTft 
at DAKA POINT, ORANGILCOIISrTY, OAT.TRQRNIA 
tjtyfX^ 
ulfjp Jumping JfnHlnimmt consisting of 
two pages, besides this one, was, on the day it bears date, 
by the said DEAN-GHARiEO DURNIIAM 
signed, published by as, and declared to be HIS 
last will and testament, in the presence of us, who, at 
HIS request in HIS presence, and in the 
presence of each other, have subscribed our names as 
witnesses thereto. 
residing at-^JLJtJfcT-ik _ - 2 < ^ ^ 2 J . _ „ . 
residing at / f / f W fc+*+* J& 2 ^ ^ 7 7Zc ffrff 
"!PI »r»» Qf_J'-a*»-1* 
residing at ^3SSM* ^«^»«^7> 7k~ P*. a . . 926^ 
^ M J ^ I / ^ J f t l M ^ i ^ rnuit be witnessed by at len%t two disinterred pcrsjrH 
3UWTY jT/JT5cSS5S^ r o P c r ^tnesid this will will be declared inio/ici . THE UNteRSlONiO — _ - „ _ X * n Of * I T lAKi COUNTY U ^ N - ^ - - . - -
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APPENDIX C 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
DEAN CHARLES BURNHAM, 
Deceased. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
PROBATE NO. P-84-1100 
This matter comes before the Court on cross Motions for 
Summary Judgment. 
Lois M. Borden filed a Petition in this Court for formal 
probate of the Will of the deceased Dean Charles Burnham. At 
the time of his death, the deceased was married to Charlotte 
L. Burnham and had two sons and two daughters. 
Two of the children have objected to the probate of tne 
Will claiming that they were not mentioned in the Will, and 
therefore under Section 75-2-302, Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended, 
they are entitled to a share of the estate. 
The pertinent parts of the Will are as follows: 
FOURTH: I give, beqgeath and devise all 
of my property, real and personal, of every 
kind and nature whatsoever, and wheresoever 
situate to my wife, Charlotte Lane. 
FIFTH: In the event any beneficiary, legyal 
heir, heirs of issue make claim under this 
Will, singly, or in conjunction with any 
other person or persons, or shall contest 
in any Court the validity of this Will, 
or shall seek to obtain an adjudication 
of any proceedings in any Court that any 
provision of this my last Will and Testament 
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is void, or shall seek otherwise to void, 
nullify, or set aside any of its provisions, 
then and in that event, the right of said 
person or persons shall be determined as 
if that person or persons had predeceased 
me, and the execution of all provisions 
of this declaration of my last Will and 
Testament without surviving issue. My executrix 
is directed to defend at the expense of 
my estate any contest or other attack of 
any nature whatsoever on this my last Will 
and Testament or any of the provisions thereof. 
Section 75-2-302 (a) (5) , Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended, 
provides as follows: 
75-2-3§2. Pretermitted children.—(1) 
If a testator fails to provide in his will 
for any of his children or issue of a deceased 
child, the omitted child or issue receives 
a share in the estate equal in value to 
that which he would have received if the 
testator had died intestate unless: 
(a) It appears from the will that the omission 
was intentional; 
(5) If it appears from the will that the 
omission of a child of the testator was 
intentional and if no express provision 
is made in the will for the issue of the 
child, the testator will be considered to 
have intended to also omit the issue. 
Utah adopted the Uniform Probate Code in 1975. The legislature 
in doing so made several modifications, one of which relates 
to Section 75-2-302, Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended. The section 
of 75-2-302 is in fact a hybrid of the Uniform Probate Code 
and the former law. See, Utah Legislative Survey, 1977 Utah 
Law Review 521. 
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No Utah cases have been cited for the Court dealing with 
this statute although Matter of the Estate of Hilton, 649 P.2d 
488 (N.M.App 1982) involves similar facts being applied to similar 
law. 
The New Mexico statute is also a hybrid, but it is similar 
to the Utah statute in that it also provides that if a testator 
fails to provide in his will for any of his children or issue, 
the child will receive a share in the estate. See, N.M. Stat. Ann., 
1978, Section 45-2-302. 
In the Estate of Hilton, supra, case it was claimed that 
the trial court erred in receiving extrinsic evidence to determine 
the intent of the testator. In ruling on this point the court 
stated: 
Although under Section 45-2-302(A)(1), 
supra, extrinsic evidence is not admissible 
to overcome the presumption against disinheri-
tance and the intention to disinherit must 
appear in the language of the will itself, 
extrinsic evidence is admissible under the 
statute to attempt to prove the testator's 
intent to disinherit under the situations 
contemplated by Section 45-2-302(A). 
649 P.2d at 491 
I t i s c l e a r from t h e h o l d i n g in E s t a t e of H i l t o n , supra, 
and the language of the s t a t u t e i t s e l f t h a t t h e i n t e n t of t h e 
t e s t a t o r in t h i s m a t t e r must be d e t e r m i n e d from t h e face of 
the Wil l a l o n e . For t h i s reason Summary Judgment i s a p p r o p r i a t e . 
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The statute in question creates a presumption in favor 
of pretermitted children. This presumption can be overcome 
but only by examining the Will. The personal representative 
takes the position that the testator made clear his intention 
to exclude his children by leaving his entire estate to his 
wife. If a clause similar to the fourth paragraph of the Will 
in question can rebut the statutory presumption, it is difficult 
to imagine a situation in which a pretermitted heir could take 
from the testator's estate. 
In Crump's Estate v. Freeman, 614 P.2d 1096 (Okla. 1980) 
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that "Testatorial disposition 
of the entire estate does not alone affirmatively evince an 
intent to omit to provide for a child or a deceased child's 
issue." 614 P.2d at 1099. 
This Court holds, therefore, that the petitioner has failed 
to overcome the statutory presumption. 
The personal representative next argues that pursuant to 
the fifth paragraph of the Will the children are prohibited 
from taking from the estate. The actions taken by the children 
cannot be construed as a contest of the Will. When an omitted 
child takes the position that he or she is a pretermitted heir, 
the child is not contesting the will, but rather seeks to take 
from the estate in spite of the Will. See, E6tate of Hirschi, 
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113 Cal.App.3d 681, 170 Cal.Rptr. 186 (1980); In re Estate of 
Hilton, supra, and Crump's Estate v. Freeman, supra. 
For the reasons stated above the objector's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is granted. The children of the decedent will 
be allowed to take their share of the estate as if the decedent 
died intestate. 
Dated this o2 | day of March, 1985. 
ER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following this <£/ day of March, 1985: 
William L. Crawford 
Attorney for Personal Representative 
185 S. State, Suite 700 
P. 0. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Peter L. Flangas 
Mark S. Miner 
Attorneys for Objectors 
525 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
'< y^rtyu? 
ban LBKe u»iy. uian 
MAY 3 1 1985 
H. DixocLHindley, Gfrk 
DfDulf Ci«r« 
APPENDIX D 
WILLIAM L. CRAWFORD (A0749) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE £. LATIMER 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0899 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
OF 
DEAN CHARLES BURNHAM, 
Deceased. 
ORDER ON MEMORANDUM DECISION, 
ADMITTING WILL TO PROBATE, AND 
APPOINTING PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE 
Probate No. P64-1100 
Judge Philip R. Fishier 
* * * * * * * 
Petitioner's Motion for Entry of Order on Memorandum 
Decision filed with the Court on April 22, 1985 cane on for 
hearing before the above-entitled court, the Honorable Pnilip 
R. Fishier presiding, on the 6th day of May, 1985, Petitioner 
being represented by counsel, William L. Crawford, of and for 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer and Dean Charles Burnham, Jr. and Anna 
Marie Burnham (the "Objectors") being represented by their 
attorney, Mark S. Miner. After hearing arguments of counsel, 
it is hereby 
ORDERED: 
1. Objectors' motion for summary judgment is granted 
for the reasons set forth in the Memorandum Decision heretofore 
entered by the court on March 21, 1985, pursuant to which Dean 
Charles Burnham, Jr. and Anna Marie Burnham shall receive an 
intestate share of the estate as though Dean Charles Burnham 
had died intestate. 
2. The Last Will and Testament of Dean Charles 
Burnham dated July 28, 1984 is a valid will and is hereby 
admitted to probate subject to the rights of Dean Charles 
Burnham and Anna Marie Burnham as pretermitted heirs as herein-
above set forth. 
3. Lois M. Borden is appointed the personal repre-
sentative of the estate, said appointment to be effective upon 
the filing by the personal representative of an acceptance of 
appointment, pursuant to S 75-3-602, U.C.A., and a bond 
pursuant to S 75-3-603, U.C.A., in an amount at least equal to 
the amount of the estate that will pass to Dean Charles Burnham 
and Anna Marie Burnham as pretermitted heirs, said bend to be 
for their exclusive benefit. 




H. DIXON HINDLEY 
CLERK 




I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order of 
Memorandum Decision, Admitting Will to Probate and Appointment 
of Personal Representative to the following on this ^f day 
of May, 1985: 
Mark Miner 
Attorney for Objectors 
525 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
7292D 
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